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Abstract
The paper focuses on the problems of low income among immigrants, analysed by using
comparable panel datasets for two Scandinavian welfare states. After a brief survey of a
few earlier studies on immigrant poverty, we present Denmark and Sweden as
interesting cases for comparative research. Cyclical profiles have been very different
since the 1980s and both countries have experienced considerable differences with
regard to the number and composition of immigrants from the less developed countries.
Poverty rates, analysed relative to different background factors, are fairly high, in
particular when considering the welfare state background of Denmark and Sweden. A
number of differences are found in spite of the institutional similarities between the two
countries.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, low-skilled immigration to the rich OECD countries has been of
increasing importance. Many of the European OECD countries were open to
immigration of people from outside the rich OECD area until the first oil price shock in
the mid-1970s. At that time, many countries, including Denmark and Sweden, enacted
legislation to stop the flow of guest workers, and these have been in effect since then.
In the Nordic area, there has been free mobility of labour since 1954. Furthermore, both
Denmark and Sweden are members of the EU, which constitutes a broad area of free
labour mobility. The cross-country net mobility of citizens, both intra-EU and
intra-Nordic, has, however, been modest. A fairly new, but important factor regarding
international mobility is the relatively big net immigration of people from the less
developed countries to many countries in the EU, Denmark and Sweden included.
Because of the restriction on guest workers, this new wave of immigrants has consisted
of ‘tied movers’, i.e. individuals moving for family reunification or as refugees. Highly
specialized people from outside the rich OECD area can get a residence permit, but only
for a job with a specific firm for a specialized vacancy. Thus, a major change in many
EU countries concerns the composition of immigration over the last quarter of a
century, from being work-related as was the case during the guest worker period to
becoming a difficult integration process into labour markets that are characterized by
high skill requirements and relatively high minimum wages.
The difficulties of immigrants in integrating the labour market are reflected in the ratios
between unemployment rates for immigrants and for natives, cf. OECD (2001, 2002).
These ratios range from the level of 2-3 in a number of European countries, including
Denmark and Sweden, and the level of about 1 in the USA and Canada. These major
deviations are the net outcome of differences not only in labour market institutions, but
most probably also in immigration policies. In Canada, for instance, immigration
permits are granted on qualitative criteria, which enable the person to enter a job
quickly, while similar criteria for education, experience, financial status, etc. are mainly
absent in the EU.
The increasing importance of net immigration from the less developed countries,
compounded by the slow and imperfect integration into the host country’s labour market
that is obvious in many countries, is expected to have an impact on aggregate income
distribution and on poverty rates. We expect the impact in the European welfare states
to be greater on the market income compared to disposable income. Consequently, we
expect to find, in empirical studies, an increasing gap between the poverty shares among
the natives and immigrants from the less developed countries.
A small number of cross-section studies exist, which illustrate the differences in poverty
shares between immigrants and host country citizens. Some of these results are
surveyed briefly in section 2. Next, in section 3, using fairly comparable panel datasets
going back to 1984, we argue that Denmark and Sweden are relevant case-studies for a
comparative analysis of the development in poverty shares between immigrants and
natives. We also discuss briefly a number of economic and institutional factors that
make a country a relevant comparative case. Section 4 introduces our data and describes
the construction of the poverty line used in the analysis. Section 5 reviews the
development in poverty shares, as observed in Denmark and Sweden, and Section 6
concludes the paper.2
2 Some earlier studies on immigrant poverty
Earlier cross-section studies from ‘classical’ immigration countries show a substantial
difference in poverty rates, depending on the country or region of origin. This fact is
illustrated in Figure 1 with cross-section data for the US from 1980, which show that the
poverty share ranges between 6 and 37 per cent. These are summary cross-section data,
and a part of the difference could be a reflection of the changing arrival patterns over
time and subsequent variations in the duration of time in the USA.
Based on cross-section data for 1991 for 25 ethnic groups in Canadian metropolitan
areas (CMA), Kazemipur and Halli (2001) report similar results. Using the same data to
illustrate regional variations, Kazemipur and Halli (2001) find a immigrant poverty-
share pattern that fluctuates between 8 and 32 per cent (Figure 2).
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A regional variation of this magnitude is not observed for all residents of Canada, as is
seen in Figure 3. It is evident that poverty shares are much higher for immigrants than
corresponding shares for natives in all high poverty regions. There is evidence that the
economic upturn in the late 1990s has resulted in reductions in the poverty rates on the
part of recent immigrants, while there have been no changes in the situation for non-
immigrants, see Smith and Jackson (2002).
In a number of studies, Canada’s poverty—including its eventual concentration on
immigrants and manifesting as concentrated urban deprivation—is considered similar to
that found in the USA and Northern Europe. Ley and Smith (1997) compare the
geographic concentration of poverty in three major cities in Canada for 1971 and 1991.
They find a increasing dispersion over this period with regard to metropolitan poverty.
Immigrants, according to Ley and Smith, are just one group among those with limited
opportunities. Ley (1999) discusses what is termed as ‘the myth of the Canadian
immigrant underclass’. Low-income problems are discussed, but Ley (1999) also
highlights a broad range of mitigating factors in addition to the purely financial
indicators. In Canada, as in Northern Europe, poverty and deprivation are concentrated
to a large extent in neighbourhoods which most of the housing is subsidized.
Ekberg (1994) focuses on Sweden, and reports that in 1991 foreign-born families have a
poverty rate of 14 per cent while the corresponding figure for the total population is
8 per cent. Poverty rates among the foreign-born are negatively related to the years
since arrival in the host country. This finding also appears in other studies that use data
from approximately the same period (Gustafsson 1997 and Hammarstedt 2001). To take
two examples: while the cohort of 1988-90 arrivals, mainly refugees, have a poverty
rate of 28 per cent, immigrants arriving before 1969, who are mainly work migrants,
have a rate as low as 7 per cent: this is even slightly lower than that for the total
population.
An earlier study which in 1996 followed-up the development of adults from the less
developed countries immigrating to Sweden during the 1980s shows relatively large4
poverty rates (Gustafsson 1999). For example, while 12 per cent of native male adults
were classified as poor, the corresponding proportion for males originating from Poland
was 22 per cent, from Turkey 46 per cent, and from Iran as high as 63 per cent (female
rates are at the same levels). Results from an analysis on the risks of being poor in 1996
indicated that in addition to factors such as education and family type, the work history
of the immigrant since arrival had strong predictive value.
Bell (1997), using data from the GHS (General Household Survey) and Berthoud (1998)
with data from BHPS (British Household Panel Survey) find that immigrants on average
perform as well or even slightly better than natives, with regard to market income in the
UK. The data in Berthoud (1998) are disaggregated on a small number of different
immigrant groups, and this more disaggregated evidence indicates a considerable
fluctuation in the average market income, from a high level for the first or second
generation white immigrant population to a low for the first and second generation
arrivals from Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is interesting to note that the first as well as
the second generation arrivals from India have the same average market income as the
native-born white population. The gaps between high and low on the part of disposable
income are only slightly smaller. Using data from the GSOEP (German Socioeconomic
Panel) for the years 1994-98, Büchel and Frick (2001) find that in West Germany the
average market income for non-EU immigrants to be around 70 per cent of the average
level for the native-born German population. However, with regard to disposable
income, this immigrant group earned 80 per cent relative to the natives.
3 The relevance of Denmark and Sweden as comparative cases
Denmark and Sweden share the same labour market and welfare state characteristics.
But at the same time, they differ considerably in cyclical profiles and immigration
experience during recent decades, and this fact creates a unique case for comparative
analyses. The labour market in both countries is characterized by a high level of
unionization, high relative minimum wages, egalitarian wage distribution, the public
sector as a major employer and very high female participation rates. Both countries have
experienced a secular shift from low-skilled industrial jobs towards service sector jobs.
Taxes are very high in both countries which are reflected on the expenditure side by the
universal residence-based benefits for unemployment, housing, children and old age. At
the same time, the public sector offers a wide range of services in the areas of education,
health, child and elderly care, either free or at low cost.
Both countries have followed similar immigration policies, i.e. immigration from low-
income countries has been restricted to tied movers and refugees. But there have been
big differences in both the stocks and flows in international mobility. The initial stock
relative to the native population was much higher in Sweden, while in Denmark
throughout the 1990s the relative increase in the number of immigrants has been higher.
Further, there are major differences in the composition of immigrant origins, both on the
part of the stocks and the flows of arrivals. Although Denmark and Sweden have
experienced major deviations with regard to cyclical profiles during the period analysed,
both have also had problems of high unemployment among immigrants from the less
developed countries in the 1990s.5
With regard to income distribution, both countries have very low levels of inequality in
equivalent disposable incomes, i.e. after the equalizing effects of the highly progressive
taxes and regressive transfers have been eliminated. While the level of Gini coefficients
and poverty rates are low in both countries, they have increased in Sweden (Gustafsson
and Palmer 2002), and decreased in Denmark during most of the period analysed.
4 Data and poverty line
4.1 Swedish data
The data used for Sweden in this study are from the so-called SWIP database, which
consists of 10 per cent of the Swedish immigrant population covering the years 1968 to
1999, merged with a one per cent sample of the native population.1 It is based on
administrative registers and contains a large number of demographic, labour market and
income variables. In the present study, we use observations for the years 1984-97, and
immigrants in this sample are defined as persons born outside Sweden. This dataset has
the same advantage as the Danish data; it includes a large number of foreign-born
individuals compared to samples typically used to measure poverty. There is also the
advantage of a panel property, which makes it possible to follow individuals over time
and to apply a longer observation period than one year. However, the narrow definition
of a family—defined as one or two adults and their children and a person is regarded as
an adult on turning 18 years—is a disadvantage. Most important, a young adult 18 years
and older but living with his parents is treated as a separate unit. Consequently, many
young people reported to have high poverty rates might, in reality, be sharing income
with their parents. This should be kept in mind when interpreting results for young
adults, but as the definition of a family is similar in the datasets for Denmark, there
should be no distortion in the cross-country comparison because of this.
4.2 Danish data
The Danish dataset is extracted from the Institute of Local Government Studies (AKF)
panel database, which is built on administrative registers in Statistics Denmark and
covers the period since 1984. The panel dataset contains a big number of demographic,
labour market, incomes, taxes and benefit variables. The data cover 100 per cent
representation of the immigrants and their children, and a 10 per cent representative
sample of the whole population. This sampling scheme thus involves an overlap
between the representative population sample and the immigrant sample. The
classification of persons as immigrants, descendants and natives follows the definitions
applied by the Statistics Denmark, see Poulsen and Lange (1998). They differ, albeit
only slightly, from the Swedish classification criteria, i.e. being born in or outside
Sweden.
                                                
1 In the present study we restrict the analyses of Swedish data to the period ending in 1997 as a change
in sampling strategy currently makes it difficult to include observations for 1998-99 in the analysis.6
4.3 The low-income measure
To construct our low-income line (or poverty line), based on the recommendations in
Atkinson  et al. (2002), we use 60 per cent of the median in the distribution of
equivalence adjusted disposable incomes as the cut-off point. We use the OECD
equivalence scale applied to disposable household incomes (including child support and
subsidies to housing) for conversion to individual incomes, i.e. the weight is 1.0 for first
adult in household, 0.7 for other adult persons and 0.5 for every child. The equivalence
scale-adjusted household income is assigned to each household member and each
household is assigned a weight equal to the number of members irrespective of age. It
should be noted that the low-income line is calculated from the income distribution for
the full representative samples, i.e. including individuals of all ages. In the analysis
below, however, only individuals aged 18-65 are included.
5 Descriptive evidence
5.1 Recent immigration patterns
During the two latest decades, the number of immigrants in Denmark and Sweden has
increased at a relatively stable rate. As seen from Figure 4, the stock of immigrants in
Sweden has been much higher than in Denmark throughout the period. In 2001 the
share of immigrants in the total population is 12 per cent in Sweden, whereas it is 5.5
per cent for Denmark, i.e., also the relative share of immigrants is significantly larger in
Sweden.
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The development in the stocks of immigrants appears fairly smooth. This, however,
changes considerably when we look at the relative year-to-year trend in the two
countries (Figure 5). The relative increase in the stock of immigrants has been higher in
Denmark than in Sweden: 1989 and 1994 are exceptions.8
Another major difference is noted when we look in more detail at the composition of the
immigrant population by national origin. Based on the UN classification of the more
and less developed countries, we have the breakdown of the immigrant stock from these
two country groups as shown in Figure 6. According to the UN classification, the more
developed countries include all the European countries (except Turkey, Cyprus and a
number of former Soviet republics) and the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and New
Zealand, cf. Poulsen and Lange (1998). At each point in time the share of people from
the less developed country group is higher in Denmark, although both countries
experience an increasing share throughout the period. The fairly low share in Sweden is
in part a reflection of the very high number of people from Finland, who constitute an
exception to the otherwise relatively low level of cross-national migration flows
between the Nordic countries. Between 1980 and 2000 the absolute number of
immigrants from Finland drops from 251,342 to 195,447, which in relative terms,
implies a decrease from 40.1 per cent to 19.5 per cent. A major part of the increase in
the share of the less developed country immigrants in Sweden thus reflects return
migration to Finland.
Differences in the composition of immigrant origin are highlighted in Table 1, which
shows the number of immigrants coming from the nine non-western countries with the
largest expatriate communities in Sweden and Denmark. The poverty shares of these
immigrant groups in Denmark and Sweden are shown in Figures 9 and 10. People from
Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, are not included in the charts as they arrived in the two
host countries only in the second half of the 1990s. Thus income data on their part are
only for a short period. As can be seen from Table 1, the ranking by country of origin is
different for Sweden and Denmark. Sweden has a considerable community of former
Chileans and Syrians, while Somali and Pakistani immigrants are well represented in
Denmark.
Table 1
Number of residents from major non-western countries living in Sweden and Denmark, 2001
Sweden Denmark
ex-Yugoslavia 73,274 Turkey 29,680
Iraq 55,696 Bosnia-Herzegovina 18,027
Bosnia-Herzegovina 52,198 Iraq 15,099
Iran 51,844 ex-Yugoslavia 12,545
Poland 40,506 Lebanon 11,924
Turkey 32,453 Somalia 11,847
Chile 27,153 Iran 11,348
Lebanon 20,228 Poland 10,391
Syria 14,646 Pakistan 10,313
5.2 Trends in the low-income incidence
Figure 7 shows the share of individuals in Denmark having an equivalent disposable
income less than 60 per cent of the median. The low-income incidence for native Danes
appears to be very stable around 10 per cent with a very slight decrease in the later
years. For the immigrants as a whole, however, the picture is very different. From a
level of less than 20 per cent at the beginning of the observation period, the low-income9
incidence increases steadily until the early 1990s, when it stabilizes. This levelling-off
may partly be attributed to the more favourable business cycle in effect from 1994.
When the immigrant population is divided into people from the more and less
developed countries, it becomes clear that the trend for all immigrants is mostly driven
by the group from the less developed countries. For immigrants coming from the more
developed countries, the low-income share is less, below 15 per cent in 1984 but
increasing to a level just below 20 per cent.
Figure 8 shows the picture for Sweden. Initially, the share of low-income individuals
among the native population is very similar to the situation in Denmark, but throughout
the 1990s the share steadily increases. In relative terms, the increase is 50 per cent,
rising from 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the Swedish population. Among the
immigrants, the low-income share increases in the late 1980s from about 14 per cent to
approximately 23 per cent. This means that the poverty rates for immigrants in Sweden
are lower than in Denmark for each year during the period analysed. We also find
bigger differences in poverty rates for each year in the period for immigrants and
natives in Denmark than in Sweden. Finally, for both countries a widening of the
difference is observed between the poverty rates for natives and immigrants throughout
the period.
In Figure 8, when immigrants to Sweden are decomposed into the two country groups
(the more and the less developed countries), we see that immigrants from the more
developed countries are on average only slightly more likely than the natives to qualify
as low-income individuals. This observation applies to the entire period studied. For
immigrants from the less developed countries, the low-income share is around 30-35 per
cent, with an increasing trend.
The aggregated numbers by origin given in Figures 7 and 8 do not identify the factors
which would explain the differences in the poverty share levels between Swedish and
Danish immigrants, nor can they explain the bigger gap in Denmark in the poverty
shares of the native population and immigrants. In this context, a number of factors are
relevant. First, we have already observed that the relative increase in the stock of
immigrants in Denmark was much higher than in Sweden during the period, indicating
that immigrants in Denmark, especially in the 1990s, spent on average a shorter period
in the host country. This implies a lower labour force attachment and consequently a
lower level of market income. Another factor of potential importance is the difference in
the composition of immigrants with regard to ethnic background, as it is well
documented that the ease with which immigrants integrate into labour markets differs
between different groups (cf. Table 1 and Figure 6). We explore this factor further later
in the paper.
Next, as mentioned earlier, the cyclical profiles have differed considerably between the
two countries in the period analysed. Sweden had full employment, leading to excess
demand for labour until the late 1980s. This was followed by an extremely fast increase
in unemployment and a decline in labour force participation in the first years of the
1990s. Looking at Figure 8, we find a fairly stable difference between the poverty
shares for immigrants and natives until 1988, followed by a significant increase in this
difference in the depression years around 1990. Finally, the difference stabilizes from
the mid 1990s at a higher level than in the 1980s. In Denmark, unemployment increased
from a high initial level from 1986 to 1993. Since then, unemployment has declined
strongly. The poverty-share gap between immigrants and natives increased throughout10
the period due to rising unemployment, but stabilized once the cyclical situation
improved again.
Figure 7
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The factors mentioned here will, of course, interact in different ways. It should be
emphasized, however, that the labour market integration of immigrants, both its extent
and its speed, is of fundamental importance in comparing the deviations in poverty rates
between Denmark and Sweden, because in switching from market incomes to
disposable incomes, taxes and benefits have, to a large extent, the same structure in both
countries. Overall, according to OECD (2001, 2002), the ratio between the
unemployment rate for immigrants and for natives is slightly lower in Denmark than in
Sweden. At the same time, labour force participation is higher for native Danes than for
native Swedes, and participation rates in both countries have been low and on average
falling for immigrants from the less developed countries during the 1990s. The bottom
line of these arguments seems to be that the differences in poverty shares must, for the
most part, be ascribed to variations in arrival patterns and in the composition of national
origin.
From the previous charts, it is clear that immigrants from the less developed countries
are exposed to a much higher risk of having low-income status. These low-income
shares are analysed in more detail in Figure 9. The low-income shares are generally the
lowest for immigrants from Turkey, Poland and ex-Yugoslavia, and have followed
similar patterns, although at different levels. For immigrants from Pakistan, the low-
income share has been steady, between 40-50 per cent. For immigrants from Iran a peak
was reached in 1989 and the low-income share has been steadily decreasing since then.
On the part of immigrants from Lebanon, Iraq and Somalia, the low-income shares have
had an increasing trend throughout the period, with 1995 the only exception.
We see in Figure 10 that in Sweden immigrants from Poland and ex-Yugoslavia have
the lowest low-income share, as was the case in Denmark. Immigrants from Turkey,
Figure 9
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Iraq and Somalia (only available after 1993) have the highest low-income incidence
with substantial variation around an increasing trend. The trend for immigrations from
Iran has been decreasing from relatively high levels. Fluctuations in levels and profiles
over time in Figures 9 and 10 reflect, among other things, different arrival patterns and
duration of residence in the two countries.
Looking more closely at the countries covered in Figures 9 and 10, some interesting
new aspects come up. For people from ex-Yugoslavia, we find in both countries an
increasing trend in the low-income share, with a higher level in Denmark, except in
1994. We also find some interesting differences by decades for those from Iran: in the
1980s the low-income shares increase in Denmark, but decrease in Sweden, while in the
1990s, on the other hand, the low-income share is stationary in Sweden, but is falling in
Denmark, reaching nearly the same level in both countries by the late 1990s. The low-
income share for the Poles has the same profile in the two countries, but its level is
higher in Denmark. The gap is however closing by the end of the period. Finally, it is
interesting to take note of Turkey. This is the only group of immigrants with
approximately the same absolute number of people residing in Denmark and Sweden
(cf. Table 1). The incidence of low-income is very similar, but seem to be higher in
Sweden since the cyclical turning point in 1989. Thus, of the four countries compared
more closely here, we find the low-income shares to be higher in Denmark, but that the
differences tend to decline toward the end of the period. All four countries are or were
refugee countries, while immigrants from Turkey, the only country with a higher low-
income share in Sweden, are guest workers and tied movers. To analyse these pairwise
country differences is an interesting topic for future study.13
5.3 Poverty rates and years since immigration
The charts above indicate the general trend of the low-income incidence for immigrants
versus natives. It is, however, important, to recognize that these simple measures do not
reveal important determinants, such as the number of years an individual has spent in
the host country. Depending on the countries of origin, an integration period may be
needed before a certain income level is achieved. One way to examine this, is to focus
on ‘arrival cohorts’ and follow their development over time to determine whether low-
income status is a transitory phenomenon from which it is possible to ‘escape’ or
whether it is a more persistent problem. Furthermore, follow-up of the arrival groups
makes it possible to examine whether some cohorts are doing better than others. This
may, of course, be related to the immigrant composition in terms of country of origin,
age and educational level. Further, there is the issue of return or on-migration to a third
country, meaning that some people leave the cohort and that this exit can be—and very
probably is—selective. Historically, return-migration from Denmark and Sweden has
been much larger among immigrants from the developed countries than from
developing countries, cf. Jensen and Pedersen (2002).
Figure 11 shows the low-income shares for four different immigrant cohorts coming
from the more developed countries, based on the number of years spent in Denmark. It
is striking that for these immigrants the low-income share steadily decreases with the
years since arrival. All cohorts experience a low-income share of around 45 per cent in
the first year after arrival, but after 11 years incidence is at or below 20 per cent.
Though the pattern is very similar irrespective of the year of entry, it is noteworthy, that
low-income shares for the 1984 immigrants are generally the lowest, whereas the
1990 cohort is generally the highest. As seen from Figure 12, this latter point also holds
for immigrants from the less developed countries for whom it is even more pronounced.
Compared to the more developed countries, the low-income shares decline much slower
for immigrants from the less developed countries and they tend to stabilize at a much
higher level. Also, differences between the cohorts are generally larger, meaning that
the various cohorts experience very different probabilities of having low incomes. This,
of course, also reflects the differences in national background, as illustrated in Figure 9.
Figures 13 and 14 show similar data for Sweden for the same arrival cohorts. For the
developed-country immigrants, the low-income share fluctuates at arrival between
27-30 per cent for all four cohorts and is thus lower than in Denmark. However,
similarly to Denmark, we see a general decline in the low-income share as the period of
residence increases. After eight years in Sweden, the low-income share stabilizes
around 20 per cent, a level similar to what we find in Denmark. Also as in Denmark, the
immigrants in the 1984 cohort generally have a lower risk of low income than the later
arriving cohorts.
In Figure 14, the trends for the cohorts of immigrants from the less developed country
group show a very different story than for the immigrants from the developed countries.
The low-income shares in the first year after arrival vary considerably over the cohorts
and in spite of decreasing low-income rates in the very early years, they increase again
after 3-6 years (depending on the arrival cohort). The level is significantly higher,
especially for the 1990 cohort, than for the other cohorts examined. It is remarkable that
the economic situation for immigrants coming from the less developed countries
deteriorates over time, and it seems apparent that no assimilation in terms of income
takes place. Compared to Denmark, this is also noteworthy because no such increasing14
trend is found, though low-income shares have generally been higher in Denmark. It is
interesting to note that the 1984 and the 1986 cohorts seem to conform, from around
1990, to the general pattern for native Swedes of increasing low-income shares.
We thus find that later arriving immigrant groups from the less developed countries
have higher poverty rates when measured by the same number of years since entry into
the host country than the early cohort in our study. Although common to both countries,
this phenomenon is more pronounced for immigrants to Sweden, which may be a
reflection of the macroeconomic shock faced by the country as of 1990. Sweden’s
Figure 11
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macroeconomic shock in the beginning of the 1990s might also be the reason why
poverty rates among immigrants from the less developed countries increase with the
years since arrival. Further, we find that poverty rates for immigrants from the less
developed countries after the same number of years of residence, are higher in Denmark
than in Sweden.
An interesting modification to the picture of immigrant low-income shares being higher
in Denmark becomes obvious when the income-share profiles for the oldest cohort
(those entering in 1984) from the two country groups are compared, Figure 15. The low-
income share increases in the fifth year of arrival, with a cumulated increase of 10
percentage points until 1997, i.e. an increase of some 5 percentage points more than16
what occurs for Swedish-born people. At the same time, in Denmark the low-income
share declines by 5 percentage points.2 Another interesting difference is apparent for the
1984 immigrant cohort from the more developed countries: the low-income share in
Sweden is stationary around 20 per cent except for the two first years, while on the
other hand, the share in Denmark decreases throughout the period, dipping below the 20
per cent level nine years after arrival and ending at 14 per cent in 1997, i.e. thus being
only slightly above the level found for natives (cf. Figure 7).
Figure 15
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5.4 Age differences
As mentioned earlier, the summary figures may conceal considerable variation in other
personal characteristics of the individual. One major determinant is the phase of the
individual’s life-cycle at which time he is observed. Figures 16 to 19 examine the
fluctuations in the incidence of low-incomes of the immigrants according to their age
groups (19-25 years; 25-39 years, and 40-55 years).
Figures 16 and 17 represent Denmark. For immigrants from the more developed
countries, the tendency is very clear, i.e. the younger the individual, the higher the
probability of having a low income, and the likelihood increases during the 1990s.
Many of the immigrants in the 19-25 year age bracket who come from the more
developed countries are likely to be students, and the number of foreign students is
increasing over the period analysed. For individuals in their early working career (25-34
years), the low-income share is also slightly increasing over the years, whereas it is
stable for 40-55 year olds, and at the same level as for natives.
Figure 17 shows the trend of the low-income shares for the immigrants from the less
developed countries. There is not much difference in the early part of the period across
the age brackets. However, over time, and especially in the early 1990s, differences
increase, becoming very pronounced for the two younger age groups, which seem to
develop along with big shifts in the composition of immigrants from different national
backgrounds.
                                                
2 This is followed by another 5 percentage points decline from 1997 to 1999 not shown in Figure 15 in
order to keep the periods the same in the two countries, but it does appear in Figure 12.17
Figure 16
Low-income shares in Denmark according to the age brackets of immigrants
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Figure 17
Low-income shares in Denmark according to the age brackets of immigrants
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Figures 18 and 19 focus on Sweden, and Figure 18 shows that the trend for Sweden is
similar to its neighbour, Denmark, although the level for young immigrants from the
more developed countries is lower than in Denmark. However, this difference18
decreases, when Sweden was hit by the deep recession in the beginning of the 1990s. At
the end of the period, around 50 per cent of Sweden’s youngest immigrants from the
developed-country group were considered as poor, while in Denmark the proportion
was around 60 per cent.  For immigrants from the less developed countries, the
tendency, shown in Figure 19 is similar to Denmark, where, however, the differences
across ages are smaller in the early part of the observation period.
Figure 18
Low-income shares in Sweden according to the age brackets of immigrants
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Figure 19
Low-income shares in Sweden according to the age brackets of immigrants
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have reported estimates of the poverty rates for adult immigrants to
Denmark and Sweden for the period from the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s and
compared these with corresponding rates for natives. The data, extracted from two large
comparable databases, are similar, and we thus have good reason to believe that the
differences observed across countries indicate true variances. We defined poverty or
low income for both countries as a situation where the equivalent disposable income is
less than 60 per cent of the median for the country and the year under study. The focus
of the study was to examine the broad picture of the poverty rates among immigrants
versus native citizens, and to lay the foundation for further research using the present
databases.
A main conclusion of the paper is that the difference in poverty rates between natives
and immigrants has increased in both countries. This, first of all, can be traced to the
fact that poverty rates among immigrants from the less developed countries have
increased and that the number of these immigrants has increased rapidly. At the end of
the period studied, certain groups of immigrants from the less developed countries have
fairly large poverty rates in Denmark and Sweden both. In contrast, few immigrants in
the 40-55 year-old age group who originate from the developed countries were
classified as poor.
Further, we have found that while poverty rates among the developed-country
immigrants decrease as the years since immigration grow, this generally is not the case
for migrants from the developing countries. In Denmark rates are found to be going
down very slowly and in Sweden they tended to increase, parallel to the general rise in
the country’s low-income shares in the 1990s. New arrival groups from the developing
countries have higher poverty rates than the earlier arriving cohorts after the same
number of years of residence. These patterns are common to both countries.
While much of the observed pattern is similar for Denmark and Sweden, differences
also exist. Most importantly, the bridge in the poverty rates of the immigrants and of the
natives is larger in Denmark. Poverty rates among all immigrants to Denmark were
higher than those for people settling in Sweden; this applies to all years studied. While
poverty rates for natives were similar in Denmark and Sweden at the beginning of the
period studied, they remained stable in the former but increased in latter. Denmark was
thus found to have the lowest poverty record on the part of the natives, but the situation
is reversed for the immigrants of the country. The poverty shares also differ
considerably between immigrants coming from the different countries. Thus, the fact
needs to be emphasized that in Denmark and Sweden the composition of national
background of the immigrant stocks is very different. For example, the only group of
immigrations from the less developed countries with nearly the same number of
residents in both countries is the people from Turkey. All other national groups of
immigrants are much larger in Sweden. The Turkish immigrants are also an exception to
our general observation, and the poverty rates for this group are higher in Sweden.
Furthermore, the conclusion of generally lower immigrant poverty rates in Sweden is
modified when we look at the group of immigrants for which our data provides the
longest observation period, the 1984 cohort. In our future work, this is an important
topic in order to determine which parts of the observed cross-country differences are a
reflection of compositional effects and which true differences.20
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